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I. Introduction
Extraterritorial jurisdiction is the principle that permits courts
of nations to extend their jurisdiction beyond the confines of their
borders.' This jurisdictional principle allows parties that are
typically unable to overcome the burden of a traditional
jurisdictional test to have access to relief in courts in the United
States.2 One of the most notable applications of extraterritorial
jurisdiction is found in the regulation of securities transactions.
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange
Act") is a sweeping anti-fraud provision that applies to all
securities transactions, whether or not the securities are registered
on a national exchange.' As several scholars have noted, however,
this provision is vague and its legislative history is scant.4 Much
of the burden of determining the scope of this provision has fallen
I See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 929 (9th ed. 2009); Note, Predictability and
Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REV.
1310, 1310-11 (1985).
2 See, e.g., Derek G. Barella, Note, Checking the "Trigger-Happy" Congress: The
Extraterritorial Extension of Federal Employment Laws Requires Prudence, 69 IND. L.J.
889, 911-12 (1994) (noting some potential problems with establishing personal
jurisdiction in a labor dispute where defendant is the foreign subsidiary of a
multinational corporation).
3 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010). Most
provisions of the Exchange Act affect only those securities that must be registered under
the Act, while Section 10(b) applies to all securities, registered or not. Compare
Exchange Act § 14(a), with Exchange Act § 10(b)(2).
4 ARNOLD S. JACOBS, DISCLOSURE AND REMEDIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAW
§ 6:1 at 6-3 (2011) (noting that the legislative and administrative histories of § 10(b) and
Rule 1Ob-5 are sparse); Kimberly Brame, Comment, Beyond Misrepresentations:
Defining Primary and Secondary Liability Under Subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 10b-5,
67 LA. L. REV. 935, 937 (2007) (discussing the inconsistency created by the U.S.
Supreme Court's holding in Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
511 U.S. 164 (1994), that the plain reading of § 10(b) did not provide a private right of
action for securities fraud).
[Vol. XXXVII1188
2012] Is EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION STILL ALIVE?
to the courts' sense of fairness.'
For the past forty-five years, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has led the lower courts in shaping the
jurisprudence surrounding Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.6
The Second Circuit developed two distinct tests to determine
whether extraterritorial jurisdiction was proper: The "effects test"
and the "conduct test."' Other circuit courts subsequently adopted
and sometimes modified these tests.' In short, under the Second
Circuit's doctrine, if plaintiffs could show that the facts of their
particular case met-depending on the circuit-either the effects
or conduct test, or, in some cases, a combination of the two, then
the court typically found a sufficient interest in exercising
extraterritorial jurisdiction in the fraud cases.9
In June 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court drastically changed the
securities fraud landscape when it handed down the decision in
Morrison v. National Australia Bank.'o The Supreme Court held
that plaintiffs, perhaps both public and private, lack valid claims in
foreign-cubed cases." This decision shook up securities law,
leaving many judges, practitioners, and investors searching for
5 JACOBS, supra note 4, § 6:1 at 6-3.
6 Roberta S. Karmel, The Second Circuit's Role in Expanding the SEC's
Jurisdiction Abroad, 65 ST. JoHfN's L. REv. 743, 743 (1991) ("The Second Circuit has
had such a profound impact on securities law that it has been referred to in this context
as the 'Mother Court."').
7 See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968) (asserting that
Congress intended for the Exchange Act to protect U.S. markets against the effects of
improper foreign securities transactions), abrogated by Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank,
130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d
1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972) (concluding that Congress intended the Exchange Act to
provide extraterritorial jurisdiction only where there was fraudulent conduct in the
buying or selling of securities), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869.
8 See, e.g., Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 30-33 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (commenting on the various tests other courts have adopted before applying the
Second Circuit's "conduct" test despite questioning its soundness), abrogated by
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869.
9 Derek N. White, Conduct and Effects: Reassessing the Protection of Foreign
Investors from International Securities Fraud, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 81, 88 (2010).
10 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
11 See Richard Painter, Douglas Dunham & Ellen Quackenbos, When Courts and
Congress Don't Say What They Mean: Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National
Australia Bank to the Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision of the Dodd-Frank Act, 20
MINN J. INT'L L. 1, 6-7 (2011).
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ways to accommodate the expanding global securities market in
the post-Morrison regime.12 Only time will tell how Morrison will
affect both U.S. securities markets and securities markets
throughout the world.
While plaintiffs' attorneys and entities that trade on U.S.
exchanges, along with foreign securities issuers, were deciphering
the array of possible implications of Morrison, Congress took
action and addressed the issue." Congress passed the Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-
Frank").' 4 In addition to other aspects of the reform of U.S.
financial markets, the Dodd-Frank Act addresses extraterritorial
jurisdiction of Section 10(b). "
The purpose of this comment is to discuss the jurisdictional
issues raised by Morrison and the extent to which the Dodd-Frank
Act resolves them. Along with inspecting securities law, this
article will discuss other areas of law that will face the
implications of a post-Morrison world. Part II of this comment
will examine the history of U.S. securities law under Section 10(b)
of the Exchange Act and how the Morrison decision affects this
12 See id. at 6-7 (commenting that, despite its clarity, Morrison's "transactional"
test will likely create a significant amount of litigation because its design cannot
accommodate private transactions that take place both inside and outside the U.S. or
transactions where the broker-dealer or other intermediary is in a different country from
the location of the transaction); CHRISTIAN J.WARD ET AL., COUNCIL OF INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS, MORRISON V. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK: THE IMPACT ON INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTORS 1-2 (Feb. 2012), available at
http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/resource%20center/publications/CIIMorrisonwhite%
20papeFINAL.pdf (discussing the concerns of institutional investors presented by the
Morrison decision).
13 George T. Conway III, Applying the Supreme Court's Limits to "Foreign
Squared Litigation," HARVARD LAW SCHOOL FORUM ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN.
REGULATION (Aug. 10, 2010, 9:25 AM)
http://blogs.1aw.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/08/1 0/applying-the-supreme-courts-limits-to-
foreign-squared-litigation/ (discussing the district court's interpretation in Cornwell v.
Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F.Supp. 2d 260 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), that Morrison does not bar
American plaintiffs from bringing suit in the U.S. based upon securities transaction
based in foreign nations).
14 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified in scattered provisions of the U.S. Code); see
Painter et al., supra note 11, at 14.
15 Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b)(2) (codified as amended 15 U.S.C. § 78aa); see also
Painter et al., supra note I1, at 15.
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history. Part III will explain the impact of Morrison in the
securities world. Part IV will examine the legislative responses to
Morrison. Notably, soon after the Supreme Court issued its
decision in Morrison, Congress responded with a specific
provision of the Dodd-Frank Act. Part V of this comment will
discuss courts' response to these conflicting stances upon the
application of extraterritorial jurisdiction in securities fraud cases.
In addition, while the Morrison decision seems to solely implicate
securities fraud cases with foreign parities, Part VI will examine
available options for worldwide classes of plaintiffs seeking relief
in securities litigation. Finally, Part VII demonstrates the perhaps
unexpected applications of this decision, thus examining the
courts' broadening of the Morrison decision by applying it in non-
securities frameworks.
II. U.S. Federal Securities Law
In 1934, Congress expanded federal securities regulation by
passing the Exchange Act, establishing disclosure regulations for
companies that are required to register under U.S. securities law."
The goal of this legislation was to protect current and potential
investors-those who were buying shares in publicly traded
companies or had already invested." The Act created a mandate
for companies to fully disclose material information related to
their traded securities as a protective measure in order to protect
investors from fraud and encourage publicly traded companies to
act with honesty and fair dealing.'"
In the interest of investor protection, U.S. securities law
provides a recovery remedy for investors who are harmed by a
company's securities fraud." Those who are harmed by violations
16 See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 781 (2010). Section 12 of
the Exchange Act requires that securities traded on national exchanges be registered: "It
shall be unlawful for any member, broker, or dealer to effect any transaction in any
securities ... on a national securities exchange unless a registration is effective as such
security for each exchange in accordance with the provisions of this title and the rules
and regulations thereunder." Id. § 12(a).
17 Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) ("The [Exchange] Act
was intended principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices .... ).
18 See, e.g., Julie B. Rubenstein, Note, Fraud on the Global Market: U.S. Courts
Don't Buy It; Subject-Matter Jurisdiction in F-Cubed Securities Class Actions, 95
CORNELL L. REV. 627, 632 (2010).
19 See id. at 632-33 (describing that the purpose of the Exchange Act is to protect
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of the securities laws have an implied right to action set out under
the Act.20  The Exchange Act also created the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "the Commission") as the
regulatory administrative agency tasked with ensuring that
publicly traded companies comply with federal disclosure
requirements and other securities regulations.21
This article discusses the anti-fraud provision of the Act,
Section 10(b), and specifically, its jurisdictional reach. This
provision states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of
the mails, or any facility of any national securities exchange . . .
[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, . . . any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and
regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may
prescribe .2.. 2
In accordance with the purpose of Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act, companies are prohibited from using any channel
of interstate commerce to deceive investors.23  The reach of this
provision is wider in scope than other provisions of the Exchange
Act. 24 Section 10(b) is essentially an anti-fraud catchall that is not
limited to just those securities that are registered with the SEC
investors and to provide the Securities and Exchange Commission with the authority to
discipline those who violate the anti-fraud provision of Section 10(b)).
20 Id. at 632; see Exchange Act § 14; see, e.g., J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426,
432 (1964).
21 See Exchange Act § 4.
22 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2969, 2881-82 (2010) (quoting
Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b)).
23 See Exchange Act § 10(b).
24 Other provisions of the Exchange Act only apply to those securities that are
required to register under Section 12. But Section 10(b) applies to both those securities
that must be registered under Section 12 as well as any security not included in Section
12 registration requirements. For example, Section 14 includes proxy regulations, but
Section 14 specifically states that it only applies to Section 12 registered securities. See
Exchange Act § 14.
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under Section 12;25 instead it includes all securities, registered or
otherwise. 26
Unlike other provisions that apply extraterritorially, 27 the
statutory language of Section 10(b) reflects no explicit
jurisdictional language. There is no clear indication of whether
Congress intended this provision to apply only to those cases
arising within the domestic market involving domestic investors or
to expand outside of the borders of the United States, allowing
those who had invested in foreign markets to bring suit.28
A. History ofRule 1Ob-5
Immediately after the passage of the Exchange Act, the SEC
had no broad power to regulate fraud in securities transactions. 29
Resulting from Section 10(b), Rule lOb-5 was adopted on the
premise that everyone was against fraud.30 "The clear purpose of
Rule lOb-5 is to provide protection against investors being duped
into purchasing or selling securities."3' In order to provide this
protection, Rule lOb-5 provides a claim if a plaintiff can establish
the following: "(1) fraud of deceit, (2) by any person, (3) in
connection with, (4) the purchase or sale, and (5) of any
security."32 Nonetheless, beyond this idea of simple fraud
25 See Exchange Act § 12.
26 See Michael J. Calhoun, Comment, Tension on the High Seas of Transnational
Securities Fraud: Broadening the Scope of United States Jurisdiction, 30 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 679, 684 (1999); see generally Securities and Exchange Act § 14 (requiring
members, brokers or dealers to register securities before transacting any security of a
national securities exchange).
27 See, e.g., Exchange Act § 30.
28 See generally Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 636 (explaining the vagueness of the
Exchange Act in relation to U.S. securities law). The Securities Act of 1933 explicitly
states that jurisdiction is only to be applied in U.S. district courts. See Securities Act of
1933 § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2010). In contrast, the Exchange Act remains vague as to
the extent of its jurisdiction; the use of the phrase "interstate commerce" creates
questions of jurisdiction and congressional intent. See JACOBS, supra note 4, § 8:2 at 8-2
to 8-6.
29 See JACOBS, supra note 4, § 6:3 at 6-9.
30 See THOMAS LEE HAZEN & JERRY W. MARKHAM, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER
BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 696-97 (3d ed. 2009) (citing Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 767 (1917)).
31 See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION
§ 12.3[3] (6th ed. 2009).
32 See id. § 12.4.
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protection, much of what 1Ob-5 really meant was left unanswered
even after its adoption.33
One question remaining after the passage of Section 10(b) was
whether this provision of the Exchange Act provided for both a
public and a private right, or only a public right.34 Section 10(b)
lacks a provision providing for an express private right, but it does
provide an explicit public right that authorizes the SEC to take
enforcement measures against securities issuers committing
fraud.3 5  In its release adopting Rule lOb-5, the Commission
described this provision as "[closing] a loophole in the protections
against fraud administered by the Commission by prohibiting
individuals or companies from buying securities if they engage in
fraud in their purchase."36
Although Section 10(b) lacks explicit language of an express
private right for individuals to bring claims, courts have found the
existence of a private right under this section. Initially, the lower
courts found an implied private right within Section 10(b). 38 Then
as a result of the lower courts' recognition of an implied right,
even without the Supreme Court examining this issue, a private
remedy under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act became
ingrained into securities law.
Although a federal district court laid the foundation for this
private right under Rule lOb-5 in 1946, the Supreme Court would
wait almost twenty years before deciding to take up the issue. 4 0 In
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co. ,'41 the Court recognized the lack
of an express private right but nevertheless held that the plaintiffs
did have an implied private right to bring a complaint under
Section 10(b). 42 By the time the Supreme Court addressed this
33 See JACOBS, supra note 4, § 6:3 at 6-11.
34 See id. at 6-10 n.4.
35 See id.
36 Exchange Act Release No. 34-3230, 1942 WL 34443 (May 21, 1942).
37 See JACOBS, supra note 4, § 6:15; see also HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 30,
at 696-700.
38 HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 30, at 697.
39 Id. at 697-98 (quoting Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D.
Pa. 1946)).
40 See id. at 697-99.
41 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946)
42 See id. at 513.
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issue, the implied private right was so widely accepted that the
Supreme Court quickly concluded the existence of a private right:
"While this language makes no specific reference to a private right
of action, among its chief purposes is 'the protection of investors,'
which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where
necessary to achieve that result."'
Nonetheless, the implied right of injured investors became
more restricted as time passed.4 4 After a shift in the Supreme
Court's composition in 1975, cases began to mark a change in the
Court's interpretation of application of Section 10(b).4 5 This new
approach to Section 10(b) tended to be narrower, including the
Court's stance regarding implied rights of action.46
In Cort v. Ash4 7 the Supreme Court developed a four-part test
to use in determining if a private right should be applied, thus
revoking the Court's broader position on allowing for implied
rights of action.48 Nonetheless, due to the long history of hearing
claims of private rights in security fraud cases, the Court
essentially "grandfathered in" this implied right of Section 10(b).4 9
43 J.1. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964). "[C]ases have deduced a
congressional willingness to permit implied rights of action from presumptions regarding
the legislature's intent and Exchange Act provisions enacted in the 1930s." JACOBS,
supra note 4, § 6:15 at 6-58.
44 See HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 30, at 697.
45 Id.
46 Id. As a conservative majority took control of the Supreme Court in 1975, the
Court's stance on implied public rights shifted, producing a "narrow reading" of Rule
lOb-5. Id
47 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
48 See id. at 78. The four-part test established in Cort v. Ash allows for an implicit
private right of action by considering:
Is the plaintiff one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was
enacted,-that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff?
Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to
create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with the underlying
purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?
And finally, is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an
area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer
a cause of action based solely on federal law?
Id. (internal citations omitted).
49 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730 (1975)
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Neither Cort nor Cannon v. University of Chicago,"o decided by
the Supreme Court four years later, overturned precedent allowing
for an implied private right under Rule lOb-5.5 ' As a result, the
implied right continued to be recognized as a valid claim in U.S.
courts.52
B. Rule 10b-5 and International Securities Issuers
Initially, this private right was extended only to U.S. citizens."
This began to change as international law began to accept that
Congress could extend U.S. regulatory laws outside of U.S.
borders with regard to conduct that had a substantial domestic
effect.54 After this shift, the United States began to extend its
securities protections abroad, including this implied private right
of action.5  "U.S. courts [initially] applied domestic regulatory
law only to conduct occurring within the United States. Over
time, this strict construction eroded as nations recognized the
validity under international law of regulating foreign conduct
when the conduct has substantial domestic effects."5 6
Due to the application of Section 10(b) to foreign securities
issuers, foreign securities issuers have become subject to U.S.
securities laws in two instances.5 ' First, if the foreign issuer offers
(commenting on the Court's ready acceptance of the consensus of the lower courts that
the Exchange Act implied a private right); Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S.
375, 380 (1983) ("[A] private right of action under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and
Rule 1Ob-5 has been consistently recognized for more than 35 years. The existence of
this implied remedy is simply beyond peradventure.").
50 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
51 See id; HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 30, at 701 (citing Cannon v. Univ. of
Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979)).
52 See Cort, 422 U.S. at 78 (establishing a four-part test to determine whether the
implicit private right is available); HAZEN & MARKHAM, supra note 30, at 700-01.
53 Hannah L. Buxbaum, Transnational Regulatory Litigation, 46 VA. J. INT'L L.
251, 268 (2006) [hereinafter Buxbaum, Regulatory Litigation].
54 See id. at 268-69.
55 See id. at 269 (citing U.S. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945)) The idea of defining substantial effects is difficult as it creates deference for the
judge to decide whether or not he believes there to be substantial domestic effects, so
much that bringing the claim within the court's jurisdiction would be permissible. Id.
56 Id. at 268-69. The U.S. extended its securities law protection in those cases
where the activity had substantial domestic implications. Id.
57 See Natalya Shnitser, A Free Pass for Foreign Firms? An Assessment of SEC
1196 [Vol. XXXVII
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or sells stock on a U.S. securities exchange, the issuer must
comply with U.S. securities law." Second, if at least 300 U.S.
investors purchase securities sold by a foreign issuer, then that
foreign issuer must register in accordance with U.S. securities
laws.5 9 While this registration is required, foreign issuers are
eligible for the foreign private issuer exemption.6 ' This exemption
enables foreign securities issuers to avoid most of the disclosure
requirements of the Exchange Act.61
As the implied right expanded to include foreign plaintiffs,
they began to take advantage of it and sought the protection of
U.S. securities laws for a variety of reasons.62 U.S. securities laws
are "aggressive as compared to other nations," making U.S. courts
appealing to foreign investors who are deciding which jurisdiction
to file their securities fraud claim.63
Beyond the aggressive nature of U.S. securities law, foreign
plaintiffs also began to observe a unique advantage to filing in the
United States; namely U.S. courts are known for the enormous
amount of monetary damages rewarded to plaintiffs. 64  For
instance, in 2006, the amount of monetary damages awarded to
private plaintiffs in securities fraud cases was $17 billion.65
Foreign investors see massive amounts of money being awarded to
plaintiffs in such cases and want the same. 6 Despite the higher
possible remuneration, these large damages awards come at a cost
of increased litigation prices.67 Therefore, foreign investors must
and Private Enforcement Against Foreign Issuers, 119 YALE L.J. 1638, 1650 (2010).
58 See id. at 1650-51.
59 See id. at 1651. The issuer must also have at least $10 million in total assets. Id.
60 See id.; see also SEC Rule 3b-4, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2 (2008).
61 See Shnitser, supra note 57, at 1651.
62 See Danielle Kantor, The Limits of Federal Jurisdiction and the F-Cubed Case:
Adjudicating Transnational Securities Disputes in Federal Courts, 65 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURv. AM. L., 839, 839-42 (2010).
63 See id. at 853.
64 See generally id. at 849 (explaining the nature of judgments given in favor of
plaintiffs in securities fraud cases).
65 Shnitser, supra note 57, at 1685. During this same period, SEC sanctions against
defendants in securities fraud cases totaled $3.275 billion. Id.
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weigh the advantages of filing claims in U.S. federal courts against
the disadvantages of high litigation costs and the unpredictability
of the U.S. judicial system. As later discussed, whether or not
extraterritorial jurisdiction exists in Rule lOb-5 cases will have a
considerable effect on the lack of predictability in U.S. securities
fraud cases.6 9
C. The Globalization of Securities Markets and U.S.
Jurisdictional Limits
As securities markets become increasingly globalized, it is
becoming more important for domestic courts to know how to
manage "transnational" securities fraud cases being filed in U.S.
courts by both private plaintiffs and U.S. administrative agencies.'o
The United States Constitution defines the scope of a federal
jurisdiction, and as a result, federal courts are barred from
extending their jurisdiction beyond the limits set out in Article III
of the Constitution." Along with this constitutional limitation,
Congress may also limit the federal courts' jurisdiction.7 2
Historically, domestic courts have approached extraterritorial
jurisdiction with the presumption that U.S. laws do not extend
outside of the United States, unless Congress expressly states the
intent for them to do so. 3
Congress has the constitutional authority to extend the reach of
domestic laws beyond the United States' borders. If, however,
Congress is silent with regard to whether jurisdiction extends
beyond the borders of the United States, there is a presumption
against extraterritoriality....
68 See id
69 See generally id. (explaining the deterrents plaintiffs face in deciding whether or
not to litigate a securities fraud case in U.S. courts).
70 See generally Calhoun, supra note 26, at 679 (explaining the increasing burden
of policing domestic securities markets).
71 See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, §2; see also Calhoun, supra note 26, at 685-86.
72 See Calhoun, supra note 26, at 685-86. The Constitution establishes the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. As the Court found in Marbury v. Madison this is a
ceiling upon its jurisdiction, not the starting point. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). The
Constitution allows for Congress to create lower federal courts. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
73 See John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajursidictionality, 104 AM. J.
INT'L L. 351,352 (2010).
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. . . The presumption against extraterritoriality can be overcome
if the language and structure of a statute or its legislative history
indicate a congressional intent that the statute ought to apply to
areas of the United States.74
This presumption exists because Congress's power is
recognized as domestic power-power to legislate directly on
issues within the borders of the United States." As a result,
Congress should avoid involving itself in international conflicts. 76
1. Foreign-Cubed Cases
Arising out of the globalizing securities markets are class
action security fraud cases known as foreign-cubed cases.7 7 A
foreign-cubed case is the exercise of the private right under
Section 10(b) in the form of "a class action brought against a
foreign issuer on behalf of a class that includes foreign investors
who transacted on a foreign exchange."7  The number of foreign-
cubed cases filed in U.S. courts has increased as the world's
securities markets have become more interconnected.7 9 In 2007,
foreign-cubed cases made up forty percent of all securities fraud
cases filed in U.S. courts.o This has occurred because foreign
plaintiffs invested in foreign securities markets look to file
complaints in U.S. courts, as opposed to filing in foreign courts,
where there may be jurisdiction, and perhaps, even more
appropriate jurisdiction; they do so because investors receive more
protection under U.S. securities laws than under foreign securities
laws."'
These cases are not novelties to U.S. courts.82 The foreign
74 Calhoun, supra note 26, at 687-88.
75 See Knox, supra note 73, at 354.
76 See id.
77 Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 628-29.
78 Id. at 629.
79 See Kantor, supra note 62, at 841 & n.3.
80 See Shnitser, supra note 57, at 1685 (citing Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational
Class Actions Under Federal Securities Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14, 28 (2007)).
81 See Kantor, supra note 62, at 849-50 (describing the higher penalties available
for investors and increased liability for defendants in U.S. courts).
82 See Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 629.
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parties, who are harmed by investing in a global securities market,
"are forcing the expanded engagement of domestic courts."8 1
These foreign actors are essentially forcing U.S. courts to consider
whether subject matter jurisdiction exists and U.S. courts often
decide that these foreign-cubed cases are within their
jurisdictions.84 As a result, there is a disconnect between the way
jurisdiction is typically granted in securities cases and the
principles which govern anti-fraud doctrine within securities
markets.
The links between the world's securities markets are becoming
stronger and more prominent, creating a need for nations to create
regulatory means for controlling the securities market. 86  This
increased globalization imposes new burdens on countries to
ensure that they are taking measures to police and regulate
securities markets within their borders.8 ' Globalization opens
courts to cases that may be composed of foreign plaintiffs and
foreign companies that possess little apparent connection to the
nation's courts.8 8 The lead plaintiff in these private foreign-cubed
cases is generally the plaintiff or plaintiff group with the largest
financial stake in the matter.89 Regardless of the lack of a logical
connection between these foreign plaintiffs and the United States,
U.S. courts are responsible for deciphering which cases are within
their jurisdictions."
Foreign-cubed cases should raise concern for U.S. courts for
several reasons. One such reason is the increasing rate at which
these cases are filed; plaintiffs' attorneys work diligently to find
83 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, National Jurisdiction and Global Business Networks,
17 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 173 (2010) [hereinafter Buxbaum, National
Jurisdiction].
84 See id at 178.
85 See id.
86 See Buxbaum, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 53, at 261.
87 See Calhoun, supra note 26, at 679.
88 See id. at 679-80.
89 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions Under Federal Securities
Law: Managing Jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 14, 28 (2007)
[hereinafter Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions].
90 See Calhoun, supra note 26, at 680 (noting that while there is a general
presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction, there will be some circumstances where
a court will find that there is subject matter jurisdiction in a foreign-cubed claim).
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possible foreign plaintiffs who can file such suits in the United
States.9' This process leads to problems involving conflicts of law
because foreign plaintiffs are suing under U.S. securities laws
against foreign defendants, rather than American defendants.92
These foreign defendants may be acting within the laws of their
countries of domicile but perhaps not in accordance with U.S.
securities laws.93 Ultimately, courts need to decide if this is an
acceptable extension of the U.S. hegemony.94
Aside from looking to the legislative intent of whether to
extend jurisdiction extraterritorially, international comity creates a
presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction.95 Simply stated,
Congress may restrict the reach of American laws based upon
goodwill towards sovereign foreign nations.96 Allowing foreign-
cubed cases into U.S. courts encroaches upon the sovereignty of
foreign nations that possess their own system of governance.97 As
a result, the Supreme Court has shied away from allowing the
extension of American laws into the jurisdiction of foreign
nations.9 "Traditional extraterritoriality analysis flows from a
principle of international law: because all sovereign nations enjoy
exclusive authority to regulate within their territorial borders, no
nation will apply its laws to conduct that occurs in another." 99
This principle suggests that U.S. courts should apply U.S.
securities laws to only those cases that occur within U.S.
91 See Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions, supra note 89, at 17.
92 Id. Buxbaum lays out four main reasons why the U.S. should be concerned with
foreign-cubed cases infiltrating U.S. courts. Id. The first two reasons are discussed in
this comment: these cases are increasing at an alarming rate, and the role that plaintiff
attorneys have in this increased number of foreign-cubed litigations. Id. The third
reason is that the jurisdictional rules applied in securities cases do not match up with the
"substantive anti-fraud doctrine." Id. Finally, these cases display, in some sense, the
assumptions that judges bring to the table when they undergo the analysis of securities
law jurisdiction. See id. at 17-18.
93 See Buxbaum, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 53, at 279, 288-89.
94 See id. at 256. This extension of U.S. courts at the least appears to be judicial
imperialism, and at the extreme, hegemonic behavior on the behalf of the United States.
Id.
95 See Calhoun, supra note 26, at 688.
96 See id.
97 See Buxbaum, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 53, at 268.
98 See id. at 688-89.
99 See Buxbaum, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 53, at 268.
1201
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
borders. 0
D. Jurisdiction and Section 10(b)
Congress provided federal courts with the authority to hear
cases arising under the Exchange Act.'o' Generally, it is easy to
establish federal jurisdiction in a Section 10(b) claim because
plaintiffs only have to make a showing that the fraud was carried
out "by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce .. ."102 Stated another way, one court ruled "'the
crookedness need not appear at all in the instrumentality used' and
that it is 'sufficient if it were shown that fraud was used or
employed in connection with the use of instruments of interstate
commerce or the mails."' 0
3
Nonetheless, the text of Section 10(b) fails to explicitly state
explicitly whether this provision extends extraterritorially.'0 4 This
has led to the questioning of what Congress intended when it
passed the legislation and how courts are to apply it to
extraterritorial foreign-cubed cases.'0o As a result, parties
participating in securities transactions push the courts into
deciding where to draw the line to limit jurisdiction in foreign-
cubed cases.'06 "When ... a court is confronted with transactions
that on any view are predominantly foreign, it must seek to
determine whether Congress would have wished the precious
resources of U.S. courts and law enforcement agencies to be
devoted to them rather than leave the problem to foreign
countries."'
Courts seem to recognize a limitation on extending jurisdiction
extraterritorially in other areas of law.'0o This limitation is based
upon the principle of international comity, respecting the
100 See id.
101 See Calhoun, supra note 26, at 686-87.
102 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a)(1) (2010).
103 See HAZEN, supra note 31, § 12.3[3] (citations omitted).
104 Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 636.
105 Id. at 636-37.
106 See id. at 628-29.
107 Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975).
108 See Knox, supra note 73, at 362-65 (discussing the decision by the Supreme
Court to narrow extraterritorial application of a federal statute criminalizing piracy).
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sovereignty enjoyed by foreign nations.' 09 Therefore, foreign
nations maintain the authority to create their own structures and
mechanisms for regulation and sanctioning securities fraud within
their borders."0 Overstepping these boundaries creates conflicts
between the substantive nature of the securities law applied to
Section 10(b) cases and the securities laws of the other country
that is involved."'
A result of the statutory silence on the issue of jurisdiction has
been the creation of two different interpretations of how to
determine whether jurisdiction applies." 2 Those endorsing the
first approach argue that the lack of statutory language on
extraterritorial jurisdiction should be read as depriving U.S. courts
of the authority to try foreign-cubed Section 10(b) cases." 3 But,
those supporting the second interpretation note that Section 10(b)
does provide U.S. courts with the authority to extend
extraterritorial jurisdiction because it uses the language "interstate
commerce," which is defined as "commerce . . . between any
foreign country and any State."l'
This area of law has lacked legal clarity for almost forty-five
years."' The Supreme Court has refused to clarify how courts
should decide whether jurisdiction should be extended in foreign-
cubed cases,"' leaving this to the lower courts' discretion.117
Using their discretion, the lower courts have historically granted
foreign-cubed plaintiffs with extraterritorial jurisdiction because
they found that Congress passed Section 10(b) to regulate fraud
within securities markets."' Therefore, there was no reason why
109 See id. at 365.
110 See id.
Ill See Buxbaum, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 53, at 270.
112 Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 636.
113 See id at 636.
114 See id. at 636-37 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78c(17) (2006)) (citing Katherine J. Fink,
Such Stuff as Laws Are Made On: Interpreting the Exchange Act to Reach Transnational
Fraud, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 441, 450 (2001)).
115 See Calhoun, supra note 26, at 681.
116 Id at 691-92 n. 87 ("The United States Supreme Court has denied certiorari to
numerous cases involving the issue of subject matter jurisdiction over transnational
securities transactions.") (citations omitted).
117 See id.
118 Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1336 (2d Cir.
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jurisdiction should not extend to foreign issuers of securities." 9
Giving lower courts discretion to make these decisions has
resulted in inconsistent decisions from various circuits.120  Even
with all the uncertainty surrounding the discretionary nature
surrounding the jurisprudence of foreign-cubed cases, one thing is
clear: the number of foreign-cubed cases filed has exploded in the
last two decades.12 1
A typical jurisdictional test makes it difficult for a court to
extend jurisdiction in foreign-cubed cases because the defendant is
a foreign securities issuer whose business in the United States may
not be engaging in domestic activity arising to the level of
"continuous and systematic."l 2 2  Meeting the burden of typical
jurisdictional tests is difficult for foreign-cubed cases because the
claim involves a transaction that neither took place in the United
States nor was directed at the United States. 123 In the. absence of
Supreme Court guidance on extraterritorial jurisdiction, circuit
courts have created two judge-made tests for determining
jurisdiction in foreign-cubed cases.124  These two tests were
finalized in the Second Circuit decision SEC v. Berger.125  As
these two tests developed, lower courts applied them
1972).
'19 Id. at 1336-37.
120 See Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions, supra note 89, at 17. The
inconsistency amongst the circuit courts in applying the effects and conduct test was a
policy incentive for the Supreme Court to act in Morrison v. National Australia Bank.
See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2879 (2010).
121 Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 629.
122 See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945). In International
Shoe, the Supreme Court established a standard upon which U.S. courts should base
personal jurisdiction determinations. Id. at 316. In order for a defendant to be brought
within a court's jurisdiction, the court has to find that the defendant possesses "certain
minimum contacts" within the jurisdiction so that "maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."' Id at 316. A mere
"casual presence" is insufficient to meet this standard. Id. at 317. Considering this
standard, this comment supports the idea that in order for a foreign securities issuer to be
brought within the jurisdiction, of a U.S. court, it must find that the defendant possesses
systematic and continuous contacts within the U.S.
123 Buxbaum, National Jurisdiction, supra note 83, at 178.
124 SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192-93 (2d Cir. 2003).
125 322 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2003); see Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879 (citing Berger,
322 F.3d at 192-93).
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inconsistently, leading to various interpretations.126 The lack of
consistency among jurisdictions was amplified when courts
implanted their own policy analyses into their decision-making.12 7
In essence, by using these two tests to establish jurisdiction in
foreign-cubed cases, courts have opened the U.S. judicial system
to foreign litigants seeking the protection of U.S. securities laws.128
As a result, U.S. courts are playing a larger role in the regulation
of global securities markets. 129
E. Pre-Morrison Jurisdictional Tests
1. Effects Test
The first of these two tests is known as the effects test.' The
test emerged from a 1968 decision of the Second Circuit,
Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook,'3 1 where jurisdiction was extended in a
Section 10(b) claim under the Exchange Act brought by an
American shareholder against a Canadian corporation.'32 As set
out in Schoenbaum, when applying the effects test, a court is to
ask "whether the wrongful conduct had a substantial [and adverse]
effect in the United States or upon United States citizens.""' The
Schoenbaum court believed that Congress passed the Exchange
Act intending that it would protect domestic investors and
domestic securities markets.13 4  Though the Act is domestic in
nature, the Second Circuit held that courts should not prevent the
Exchange Act from being applied to claims in which
126 See Kantor, supra note 62, at 843-44; Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 637.
127 Kantor, supra note 62, at 843-44. Courts may take into account supplemental
considerations to protect U.S. securities investors. See id ("These include comity,
interests in finality, and whether extending jurisdiction would be reasonable, efficient, or
in the interests of public policy.") (footnotes omitted).
128 See Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 629.
129 See Buxbaum, National Jurisdiction, supra note 83, at 178.
130 Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 637.
131 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968).
132 Id. at 204.
133 See Jonathan Wang, Comment, Securities Pirates: Why a More Expansive Basis
for Jurisdiction over Transnational Securities Fraud Will Prevent the United States from
Turning into the Barbary Coast, 62 ADMIN. L. REv. 233, 228 (2010).
134 See Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206.
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extraterritorial jurisdiction should be applied."'
Courts have an interest in ensuring that the laws of the United
States protect U.S. citizens.13 6  Considering this interest, courts
should extend their jurisdiction to include foreign-cubed cases.
Essentially, this test is contingent upon the location where the
conduct's effect are experienced,' as well as how a court decides
to define "substantial" in those circumstances. 3 8 The effects test
confronts courts with a dilemma: Do U.S. courts extend
jurisdiction to foreign investors who invested in a foreign market
just because the effects of this fraudulent conduct are felt in the
U.S. market or amongst its citizens?'39 While the belief is that
such claims also will have a domestic impact, this creates a system
where jurisdiction can be extended to cases that take place
between foreign investors and foreign companies as long as the
fraudulent conduct's effect is felt within the United States.140
The plaintiff in a foreign-cubed case must first show that the
fraud occurred, which due to its nature was outside of any U.S.
securities market, and second, that as a result of this fraud, the
U.S. markets are adversely affected. 14 1 In order to overcome the
burden set by this test, the plaintiff must show that the adverse
effect was a particularized harm experienced by the plaintiff.'4 2
Courts have not upheld jurisdiction when the harm was general in
nature.143
The performance of foreign securities markets affects the
behavior of the U.S. markets. Thus, U.S. courts are protecting
domestic markets by singling out any activity, domestic or
otherwise, that affects the United States. 144 When information is
135 Id.
136 See Wang, supra note 133, at 228.
137 See Buxbaum, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 53, at 277.
138 See Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions, supra note 89, at 42.
139 See Buxbaum, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 53, at 277.
140 Id.
141 Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions, supra note 89, at 42.
142 Id.
143 See id. at 42 ("[A] diminishment of investor confidence in the securities markets
are not a sufficient jurisdictional basis. [Instead] [p]laintiffs must point to specific
adverse effects[,] for instance, the artificial elevation of a security's price . . . .") (internal
parenthesis omitted).
144 See Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 637-38 (citing Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405
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released into one market, this information has the potential to
travel to securities markets in other nations, affecting the price of
securities.'4 5 This integration of knowledge is called the efficient
market hypothesis.14 6 This spread of information can take place,
essentially, in a negligible amount of time due to advances in
technology.147
To prove fraud, a plaintiff must prove reliance upon fraudulent
activity.14 The fraud-on-the-market theory is a common means by
which plaintiffs attempt to prove a presumptive reliance.'49  In
foreign-cubed cases, plaintiffs have attempted to use this theory in
order to prove reliance upon the fraudulent activity, but their
attempts have been unsuccessful.'s
Similar to domestic plaintiffs, plaintiffs in foreign-cubed cases
use the fraud-on-the-market argument to show that there was
reasonable reliance on the fraudulent misrepresentation.'' The
F.2d 200, 206 (2d. Cir. 1968)).
145 See id. at 651.
146 See id. at 635 (citing Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 241-42 (1988)
(footnote omitted)).
147 See id. at 652.
148 37 C.J.S. Fraud § 50 (2008) ("Reliance is an essential element of a claim for
fraud.") (footnote omitted); see also 79A C.J.S. Securities Regulation § 265 (2008)
("Reliance by the plaintiff upon the defendant's deceptive acts is an essential element of
the private cause of action for securities fraud under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934.") (footnote omitted).
149 Related to the effects test is the theory of fraud-on-the-market. Jeffrey L
Oldham, Taking "Efficient Markets" Out of the Fraud-on-the-Market Doctrine After the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 995, 1010 (2003). Fraud-on-
the-market is a rebuttable presumption of reliance. See 79A C.J.S. Securities Regulation
§ 273 (2008). The Court in Basic v. Levinson stated that there was an accepted
presumption that the
persons who had traded . .. shares had done so in reliance on the integrity of the
price set by the market, but because of . . . fraudulent material
misrepresentations [or omissions] that the price had been fraudulently depressed
[or inflated]. Requiring a plaintiff to show a speculative state of facts . . . would
place an unnecessarily unrealistic evidentiary burden on the Rule lob-5 plaintiff
who has traded on an impersonal market.
Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 (1988) (citations omitted).
150 See Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 647.
I51 Id.
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Supreme Court's principle regarding global fraud-on-the-market is
that by depriving U.S. courts of the authority to possess
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the United States cannot protect
against the realistic dangers of today's globalized and
interconnected securities markets.15 2 Courts have rejected this
argument because accepting this premise would have the effect of
extending the reach of U.S. jurisdiction too far into the judicial
sovereignty of foreign nations.'5 3
Overall, the burden of the effects test has generally been a
difficult bar for foreign-cubed plaintiffs to meet.'5 4 U.S. courts
view injury to U.S. securities markets as independent from those
injuries that occur elsewhere.'"' Also, courts may differentiate
between harms arising from the same wrongful conduct. 5 6 For
instance, a court may extend jurisdiction to those claims resulting
from an independent injury to U.S. markets, while at the same
time denying jurisdiction in those cases where the harm occurred
elsewhere, even if these harms arose from the same act. 1' In
reaction to claims based upon the effects tests, courts have
implemented the "transaction location" rule; this allows for courts
to presume that jurisdiction over a securities fraud claim lies
within the country where the fraud took place. 5 1
2. Conduct Test
If conduct within the United States sufficiently meets two
standards-substantial and extensive-courts have extended
jurisdiction to cover foreign-cubed cases through a conduct
152 See id. at 652.
153 See id at 649 (citing In re AstraZeneca Securities Litigation, 559 F. Supp. 2d
453, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). Instead of making an evidentiary showing of reliance,
plaintiffs in In re AstraZeneca presented a global fraud-on-the-market argument to the
court in order to show presumed reliance. Id. at 648. The Court rejected the argument
stating that it did not see that this theory "[held] true on a global level." In re
AstraZeneca Securities Litigation, 559 F. Supp. 2d 453, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). In this
case, the Court stated that if it were to extend this argument of global fraud on the
market, it would be allowing U.S. jurisdiction to extend too far. Id.
154 Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions, supra note 89, at 42.
155 Id. at 42.
156 Id. at 42-43.
'57 Id.
158 Id. at 43.
1208 [Vol. XXXVII
2012] Is EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION STILL ALIVE?
focused test.'59 Under the conduct test, courts must evaluate the
nature of the fraudulent conduct that occurred within the United
States and determine whether it was substantial and extensive
enough to allow the claim to be brought in a U.S. court.' Since it
requires a subjective interpretation, application of the conduct test
has failed to be consistent. Subjectivity arises when a court has to
decide how much domestic conduct is sufficient to find
jurisdiction in a foreign-cubed case.' 6'
Under the conduct test, foreign plaintiffs seeking to bring a
claim based on U.S. securities law will ground their claim in a
defendant's fraudulent conduct that occurred within the United
States and caused the plaintiffs injury, even if the injury was
experienced elsewhere.' 62 While the conduct test was established
in Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell,163 courts later
modified this jurisdiction-determining test into its current form.164
The current version of the conduct test possesses the additional
requirement of determining if the conduct goes beyond being
"merely preparatory." 65  Under this requirement, if a plaintiff
overcomes this burden by showing that the fraudulent conduct was
more than merely preparatory, then a court can find that there is
jurisdiction even if the there were no domestic consequences.166
Aside from requiring activity that is more than merely
preparatory, some courts have raised the threshold to require that
the domestic conduct be a direct cause of foreign investor's
159 See Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d
Cir. 1972).
160 See Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 639.
161 See Wang, supra note 133, at 229.
162 Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions, supra note 89, at 43; Rubenstein, supra
note 18, at 639.
163 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
164 Rubenstein, supra note 18, at 639-40.
165 See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v.
Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 195 (2d Cir. 2003). The court stated that there should be no
jurisdiction in those cases where the foreign securities issuer's actions within the U.S.
were "merely preparatory." Bersch, 519 F.2d at 987. Courts should look for conduct
within the United States which directly caused the injury. Id. at 993. U.S. courts can
decide if actions are "merely preparatory" if the court is able to find that the actions
taken within the United States compared to those abroad are "relatively small. " Id. at
987.
166 See Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions, supra note 89, at 48.
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injury.167 This burden can be overcome if the plaintiff is able to
show that there was "specific reliance on misstatements made
within the United States in order to establish reliance." 6 8
The idea behind the test is that extraterritorial jurisdiction
should be extended in order to prevent the United States from
becoming a "haven for fraudulent behavior that harms investors
and markets elsewhere."l6 9 To achieve this, U.S. courts extend
jurisdiction to those cases where there is a substantial and adverse
effect within the United States or upon its citizens, or in instances
where the fraudulent conduct occurred within the United States.'70
Jurisdiction is extended to prevent the United States from
becoming a haven of fraud."' As one judge described, "[w]e are
reluctant to conclude that Congress intended to allow the United
States to become a 'Barbary Coast,' as it were, harboring
international securities 'pirates."" 7 2
III. Morrison v. National Australia Bank Changes the
Application of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
In June 2010, the Supreme Court decided the issue of U.S.
courts applying extraterritorial jurisdiction in foreign-cubed
cases."' In Morrison v. National Australia Bank, the Supreme
Court handed down a decision contrary to years of jurisprudence
in U.S. circuit courts.'74 The Supreme Court's decision in
Morrison significantly narrows the implied private right of action,
which has been read into securities law by the courts since 1934."'
Respondent, National Australia Bank ("NAB"), was an
Australian company that was incorporated under Australian
corporate law.'76  NAB's securities were traded on foreign
securities markets including the Australian Securities Exchange,
167 Buxbaum, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 53, at 276.
168 Id
169 See Wang, supra note 133, at 226.
170 See SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977).
'7' Id.
172 Id
173 See Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
174 Id. at 2888.
175 See HAZEN, supra note 31, § § 12.3-12.7.
176 Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167, 168 (2d Cir. 2008).
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London Stock Exchange, Tokyo Stock Exchange, and New
Zealand Stock Exchange."' NAB did not allow its securities to be
traded on any U.S. exchange, but it did trade American Depositors
Receipts (ADRs) on the New York Stock Exchange."'
Additionally, NAB had American operations since 1998, when it
acquired HomeSide Lending, Inc., a mortgage company located in
Florida.'79
The plaintiffs in this case were a class of Australian investors
who had purchased NAB's securities.8 o They brought a foreign-
cubed claim based on HomeSide's accounting practices, alleging
that NAB knew that HomeSide officers manipulated the mortgage
company's financial records in order to make it appear that the
company was more valuable than it actually was.'"' The claim
against NAB was based upon the alleged fact that NAB knew that
these deceptive practices were taking place.'8 2 Since NAB failed
to act, plaintiffs alleged that they, as investors, were injured when
NAB's securities drastically decreased in value.'8 3 Plaintiffs
brought this claim under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.18 4
The issue of the case was "whether the judicially implied
private right of action under [Section] 10(b) of the [Exchange] Act
should be allowed in class action fraud claims by foreign investors
who purchased foreign stock issued by a foreign company."
The Supreme Court had to decide if Section 10(b) specifically
applied to these facts, thus giving the Court the opportunity to
officially extend officially the jurisdiction of U.S. courts to cover
177 See id.
178 See generally Morrison, 547 F.3d. at 168. The Supreme Court did not explain
why it did not consider the Respondent's ADRs traded on the New York Stock Exchange
in the jurisdiction analysis.
179 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875; Morrison, 547 F.3d at 168-69.
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foreign transactions between two foreign parties.'"' The Second
Circuit Court of Appeals applied the conduct test to the facts and
found that, under Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the plaintiffs lacked subject matter jurisdiction.18 7 It
upheld the district court's decision to dismiss the complaint.'"
The Second Circuit based its decision on the lack of a
sufficient showing of causal finding that these facts provided too
lengthy of a causation, chain between the domestic conduct and
the injury experienced by Australian investors.189 It concluded this
conduct did not have an effect within the United States or upon
citizens thereof and that the conduct did not occur within the
United States.' 90 As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsberg later expressed
during oral argument before the Supreme Court, "this is an
Australian plaintiff, Australian defendant, shares purchased in
Australia. It has 'Australia' written all over it."'91
After granting certiorari in Morrison and reviewing the lower
court's decision, the Supreme Court came to the same final
result.' 92 While the dismissal of the complaint was upheld, the
Supreme Court based its decision on different reasoning.193 In its
opinion, the majority noted that for years the lower courts had
overlooked the historic presumption against extraterritorial
jurisdiction. 14 This presumption is centered on the thought that
Congress's role is to legislate in the interest of domestic
concerns.' 9 s The Court.also noted that this presumption may be
overcome if Congress explicitly displays its intent in the statutory
language or legislative history.' 96
It is a longstanding principle of American law that legislation of
186 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
187 See id. at 2876-77; see also FED R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1).
188 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877.
189 Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167, 176-77 (2d Cir. 2008).
190 Id at 177.
191 See Transcript of Oral Argument at 7, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191).
192 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876, 2888.
193 Id at 2877-81.
I94 Id.
195 Id. at 2877.
196 Id.
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Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States. . . . It
rests upon the perception that Congress ordinarily legislates with
respect to domestic, not foreign matters. Thus, unless there is
the affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed to
give a statute extraterritorial effect, we must presume it is
primarily concerned with domestic conditions.' 97
In its discussion, the Court analyzed the statutory language and
how it should apply in deciding jurisdiction in Section 10(b)
cases.198  The Court found that Congress explicitly included
jurisdictional statements in other sections of the Exchange Act-
something that Section 10(b) lacks.' 99 Since Congress took the
time to include precise jurisdictional statements in those sections
and not in Section 10(b), the Court believed that Congress did not
intend for extraterritorial jurisdiction to apply in foreign-cubed
cases.200  The Court reasoned that if Congress had wanted it,
Congress would have included it within the statutory language.2 0'
Section 10(b) does not protect against deceptive conduct
connected to a foreign national security exchange.2 02 In this case,
the Court would not allow for the protection of U.S. securities law
to extend to the plaintiffs because there was no deceptive conduct
connected to a national securities exchange. 203  Based on this
conclusion, the Court dismissed the plaintiffs complaint, but not
on grounds of lack of subject matter jurisdiction.204 Rather, the
Court found that since only those claims that Congress intended to
be protected under Section 10(b) were valid claims in U.S. courts,
197 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
198 Id. at 2878-81.
199 Id. at 2880-81.
200 See id. It is generally believed that Congress legislates to impact domestic
matters. Id. at 2877.
201 See id. at 2881.
202 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881-82. The Exchange Act protects against
deception on a national exchange not against deception on foreign exchanges. Id. at
2882. "The fleeting reference to the dissemination and quotation abroad of the prices of
securities traded in domestic exchanges and markets cannot overcome the presumption
against extraterritoriality." Id.
203 See id. at 2888.
204 Id at 2877, 2888.
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Morrison should be dismissed based on failure to state a claim.205
Out of Morrison emerged a new, judge-made, narrow
transactional test.20 6 This two-prong test, in effect, discriminates
against a large portion of foreign-cubed cases filed within the
United States. 20 7 The first prong is that the security must be listed
on a domestic exchange. 20 8 The second is that the purchase or sale
must take place domestically. 209 This test established a bright-line
rule, which does away with the complexity and confusion of the
effects and conduct tests.21 0 The Court was looking to "weed the
doctrine at its roots and replace it with a new bright-line
transactional rule embodying the clarity, simplicity, certainty and
consistency that the tests from the Second and other circuits
lacked." 2 1 1
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens wrestled with how
exactly the Court's decision in Morrison could be reconciled with
the years of Second Circuit jurisprudence that surrounded foreign-
cubed cases-jurisprudence that had been the guidance for other
federal courts of appeals.212 Stevens suggested that the Court
incorrectly interpreted the purpose of the Exchange Act. 2 13 As the
Court's decision reflects the principle that Section 10(b) is solely
to protect transactions on domestic exchanges, Stevens argues that
Section 10(b) is more than just a protective mechanism for
domestic exchanges.2 14 Rather, he insists that its true purpose is to
protect the public interest as well as investors' interests.2 15
A. Impact ofMorrison
Morrison left the legal world disoriented as the Court whisked
205 See id. at 2888.
206 See Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622-23 (S.D.N.Y.
2010).
207 See id. at 623.
208 Id.
209 Id
210 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879-81.
211 Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 624.
212 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888-91 (Stevens, J., concurring).
213 Id. at 2891-92 (Stevens, J., concurring).
214 Id. at 2892-95 (Stevens, J., concurring).
215 Id. at 2894 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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away forty-five years of jurisprudence, and Congress, courts,
lawyers, securities issuers, and investors are still trying to
understand the impact Morrison will have on securities fraud
litigation.2 16 The Court seems to be saying that not only are
private plaintiffs barred from bringing claims, but also that the
Court will provide no exceptions for those claims filed by the SEC
against foreign securities issuers.2 17 Thus, the Court appears to bar
claims brought by private and public plaintiffs alike. The Court's
opinion sets forth a lack of clarity as to how far this new rule will
reach.2 18 Nevertheless, one thing is certain: courts now have a
clear indication as to how to handle foreign-cubed cases filed in
U.S. courts.21 9 This clear rule, in essence, bars any American
plaintiff who invested in a foreign company that only trades on
non-U.S. exchanges from Section 10(b) protection and from filing
a securities fraud claim in U.S. courts.22 0
Morrison did provide a narrow test for jurisdiction against
foreign securities issuers.2 21  This transactional test precludes
many foreign-cubed actions from being filed in the U.S. 22 2  An
advantage to this bright-line transactional test, however, is that it
provides a more sufficient level of guidance to foreign securities
issuers on how to avoid U.S. courts.22 3 Prior to the Morrison test,
216 See Michele E. Rose et al., Supreme Court Closes the Border to Section 10(b)




219 Conway, supra note 13 (discussing the Cornwell court's interpretation that
Morrison does not bar American plaintiffs from bringing suit in the U.S. based upon
securities transactions based in foreign nations).
220 Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., 729 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The
first prong of the transactional test allows for suits to be brought against foreign
securities issuers who trade on a U.S. exchange. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888 (Stevens,
J., concurring). A concern is that U.S. citizens will be barred from bringing suit when
the securities issuer does not trade on a U.S. exchange. Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 626.
But the courts should consider that this U.S. investor knowingly invested in a market
where there may be a lack of regulation or available relief. Id. at 625.
221 See Cornwell, 729 F.Supp. 2d at 623.
222 See id. at 624-25.
223 See Ted Farris, Adopting Location Based Bright Line Test for Securities
Transactions-Rule 10b-5 Does Not Apply to Transactions in Securities Outside the
United States, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP (June 28, 2010),
http://www.dorsey.com/eu-corporate-morrisonvnationalbank_062510.
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it was not apparent to the securities issuer whether or not it would
be held accountable for fraudulent conduct under U.S. securities
law based upon where its securities are traded.224 The
transactional test provides clarity for a securities issuer trading on
a domestic exchange. Justice Stevens clearly understood the
implications of the transactional test:
[If] an American investor who buys shares in a company listed
only on an overseas exchange [sic]. That company has a major
American subsidiary with executives based in New York City;
and it was in New York City that the executives masterminded
and implemented a massive deception.. . . Or, imagine that
those same executives go knocking on the doors in Manhattan
and convince an unsophisticated retiree, on the basis of material
misrepresentations, to invest her life savings in the company's
doomed securities. Both of these investors would, under the
Court's new test, be barred from seeking relief under § 10(b)....
[T]he Court's rule turns § 10(b) jurisprudence (and the
presumption against extraterritoriality) on its head, by
withdrawing the statute's application from cases in which there
is both substantial wrongful conduct that occurred in the United
States and a substantial injurious effect on United States markets
and citizens.2 25
For those foreign securities issuers who seek to be outside of
the scope of U.S. law, Morrison creates a "safe zone" where such
securities issuers are untouchable by U.S. securities laws.226 If the
effect of Morrison reaches its potential, foreign securities issuers
will be protected as long as they do not trade securities on a U.S.
securities exchange.227 Perhaps the natural reaction of foreign
securities issuers that are currently traded on domestic exchanges
will be to move to trade solely on foreign exchanges where they
cannot be touched by U.S. securities laws.22 8 Therefore, Morrison
could ultimately result in a mass exodus of current securities
224 See Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 624-26.
225 See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2895 (emphasis in original) (Stevens, J., concurring).




2012] Is EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION STILL ALIVE?
issuers for U.S. exchanges to foreign markets. 229  As a result,
domestic and foreign investors on non-U.S. exchanges will seek
other protections created through litigation in that foreign country.
Additionally, more investors may participate in more offshore
securities transactions.230
It seems obvious that foreign securities issuers, in reaction to
Morrison, would leave the U.S. securities markets for foreign
markets. But this may not happen since Morrison leaves an
important question unanswered: How will courts approach foreign
securities issuers whose securities are traded on multiple
exchanges? 231  The Court did not provide an answer as to how
courts should handle claims against securities issuers that are
traded on both a foreign market and a U.S. securities exchange. 23 2
At some point, a court will have to answer this question, and then
perhaps there will be some indication to foreign issuers as to
where they will be held accountable.2 33 At that point, courts may
determine jurisdictional questions regarding whether such
transactions occurred offshore or in the United States.2 34
B. Foreign Results
As foreign securities issuers seek the protection of other
countries' borders from U.S. securities laws, foreign nations may
be forced to develop class action-type remedies as the number of
securities traded within their country increases. 235 As protection of
U.S. securities laws become less available to investors, investors
will begin to seek the protection of other countries' laws.
Foreign governments will feel the pressure to develop such
229 Id.
230 Id. Foreign securities issuers strive not to be within reach of U.S. securities
laws: "Non US issuers and underwriters have always made an effort, where possible, to
avoid application of the US securities laws. National Australia Bank gives those issuers
and underwriters a bright line test they can potentially use to avoid Rule lOb-5 liability
in international securities transactions." Id.
231 See Rose et al., supra note 216.
232 See id.
233 See id (explaining that foreign companies may unintentionally benefit from the
lack of control U.S. law has over their actions after the Morrison decision).
234 See id.
235 See id.
236 Rose et al., supra note 216.
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remedies to protect investors within their country as their markets
experience increased investment.237
If other countries were to develop class action-type
mechanisms within their own judicial systems, the result would
free the U.S. judicial system from the burden of foreign-cubed
cases. 23 8  With the inability to bring a claim possessing
extraterritorial jurisdiction within the United States, the domestic
judicial system will see a decreased number of class action
litigation filed while also gaining the flexibility to devote its
judicial resources elsewhere.2 39
All of the implications stemming from the Morrison decision
give rise to a question of whether or not the United States wants to
give up its control over global securities markets. Until Morrison,
a U.S. federal court could extend its jurisdictional arm into
foreign-cubed cases as long as it found that it met one of two
subjective tests. 240  This drastically changed when the Supreme
Court severed the extraterritorial jurisdictional arm of U.S.
courts.24 1 When the Court handed down its decision, the United
States may have lost its status as a major player in regulating fraud
in global securities markets.24 2 Whether the United States should
seek to relinquish this status should, of course, be balanced with
the positive implications of this decision, such as the freeing up of
judicial resources. 243  As discussed in the next section of this
comment, there are other positive implications of the United States
withdrawing from being such a force in regulating global
securities markets, which may outweigh the benefits gained by
allowing foreign-cubed cases in the domestic courts.2 44
237 See id. A lack of extraterritorial jurisdiction could drive the U.S. to become a
haven for securities fraud. See discussion infra Part III.D.
238 Paul Bessette & Jesse Weiss, Morrison v. Nat'1 Austil. Bank: Supreme Court
Decision Limits Securities Claims By Investors Who Brought Shares in Non-U.S.
Companies on Foreign Exchanges, GREENBERGTRAURIG (July 2010),
http://www.gtlaw.com/NewsEvents/Publications/Alerts?find=137737; Rose et al., supra
note 216.
239 See Rose et al., supra note 216.
240 Id.; see also Morrison v. Nat'1 Austi. Bank, 547 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir. 2008).
241 See Rose et al., supra note 216.
242 See id.
243 See Bessette & Weiss, supra note 238.
244 See discussion infra Part III.C.
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C. Advantages to Allowing Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in
Securities Fraud Cases
In a post-Morrison world, it seems that there is a high
probability that domestic and foreign investors alike will be
deprived of U.S. securities laws' protection when the foreign
issuer that acted fraudulently is a foreign entity not traded on a
U.S. exchange. Since 1968, it has been evident that U.S. courts
have seen an advantageous justification for considering the
extension of extraterritorial jurisdiction in foreign-cubed cases.24 5
Courts admittedly extend this jurisdiction to cover foreign
securities issuers because of policy reasons that support U.S.
regulation of international entities within increasingly global
securities markets.2 46
Ultimately, the overarching interest is that the United States
should seek to ensure that it does not become a "Barbary Coast"
for securities fraud.247  Regardless of the presence of domestic
investors' interests, the United States has an interest in preventing
fraudulent behavior that originates within its borders but is
directed elsewhere.248 In its amicus brief, the SEC explained that
the presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction should not be a
consideration in securities fraud cases. 24 9  The SEC argues that if
the courts abide by the presumption, then the United States is
setting itself up as a nation that can be used as a "base" for
fraudulent activity. 250 This perspective is not to apply to cases
when the fraudulent activity takes place and its effects are felt
245 See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206-09 (2d Cir. 1968) (stating the
benefits to hearing foreign-cubed cases including protecting domestic investors).
246 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7-8,
Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191) [hereinafter
Amicus Brief-SEC].
247 Id. at 16-17 (citing SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 116 (3d Cir. 1977)).
248 Id. at 19.
249 Id. at 22.
250 See id at 6-8. This argument in favor of extraterritorial jurisdiction is
questionable. If the United States proceeds to remove itself from its self-imposed role of
global regulator, then other nations will be forced to develop their own laws and
regulations enforced in order to promote the confidence in their own securities markets,
as the United States will no longer be the force working to ensure confidence and
credibility in global markets. Therefore, the argument that the United States will become
a "Barbary Coast" is weakened because foreign securities issuers acting fraudulently will
be held accountable in an appropriate jurisdiction. Id. at 12.
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outside of the United States. 251' Rather, the SEC believes that the
presumption should be disregarded when the fraudulent activity is
based within the United States.252 In such instances, the foreign
securities issuer acting fraudulently should not be outside the
reach Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act. 253 The SEC believes that
this should be the norm for the jurisdictional analysis of U.S.
securities fraud claims, even if the effect of the fraudulent conduct
is experienced outside of the United States because it is in the
interest of the United States to protect itself from becoming a
"Barbary Coast."25 4 By regulating activity under a conduct and
effects paradigm, the U.S. courts can protect its market by
preventing the nation from becoming a "launching pad" for
securities fraud.25 5
U.S. courts involving themselves in the global regulation of
securities provides for "meaningful regulation." 256 Globalization
of securities markets creates new mechanisms for fraudulent
activity and the potential for increased levels of such activity.25 7
As securities transactions take place on a more globally diversified
scale, the chances of meaningful regulation on securities
exchanges decreases.258 If the U.S. judicial system is the global
mechanism for setting standards and regulating global securities
markets, then global securities traders play by U.S. rules
regardless of the location of the market.25 9 Thus, allowing for
private plaintiffs to bring suit in the United States would
encourage developing markets to institute regulations, equalizing
the fairness and appeal of trading on markets globally.260
Aside from policy advantages, there is also an advantage of
"promot[ing] procedural efficiency" through extraterritorial
251 See Amicus Brief-SEC, supra note 246, at 7.
252 See id. at 22.
253 Id. at 7.
254 Id. at 16-17.
255 See Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions, supra note 89, at 24 (showing that
extending extraterritorial jurisdiction to conduct cases allows the United States to protect
against unscrupulous foreign securities fraud).
256 Buxbaum, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 53, at 271.
257 Amicus Brief-SEC, supra note 246, at 19.
258 See id.
259 See Buxbaum, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 53, at 271.
260 Id
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jurisdiction.26 1 Procedurally, private plaintiff classes could remain
intact throughout the litigation.2 62 Without extraterritorial
jurisdiction, what could be a single class of plaintiffs must split
into two classes: one composed of U.S. plaintiffs and one of
foreign plaintiffs.26 3 When the classes split, more than one judicial
proceeding is then required in order to resolve the issue.2 64
D. Disadvantages of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
In its opinion, the Second Circuit mentioned "a parade of
horribles," where if U.S. courts have the authority to extend
extraterritorial jurisdiction, it would lead to "undermin[ing] the
competitive and effective operation of American securities
markets, discourage cross-border economic activity, and cause
duplicative litigation." 265 These "horribles," in addition to others,
formulate a strong basis for why the United States should not open
its courts to investors attempting to recover in foreign-cubed cases.
The dominant disadvantage arising out of recognizing
extraterritorial jurisdiction as a valid principle under U.S. law is
the implications on foreign nations.266 When it does so, the U.S.
judicial system intrudes upon the turf of foreign legal systems.2 67
International comity, while not international law, is the idea that
nations will act with "courtesy and good will" towards other
nations. 268  As nations observe this principle, expansive U.S.
securities laws regulating global securities markets could interfere
with this good will and courtesy that the United States should
extend to foreign nations.26 9 While the United States maintains a
presumption against extraterritorial jurisdiction, international
comity reinforces a presumption against one nation interfering




264 Buxbaum, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 53, at 271.
265 Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 2008).
266 See id.
267 See id.
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U.S. courts consider U.S. policies when bringing foreign
securities issuers under their jurisdiction.271  Nevertheless, courts
should also take into consideration the policy interests of all
nations with a stake in a case when interpreting the jurisdiction of
a statute.272 The policy interests considered by the United States
are ones upon which reasonable minds may differ and ones upon
which foreign nations may differ.273
The United States impedes foreign laws and enforcement
274
mechanisms when it acts as a global securities fraud regulator.
This prevents foreign nations from enforcing, or even creating,
their own securities laws and standards.27 5 Other nations may
choose to approach securities fraud differently, so the United
States must consider if enforcing its own laws instead of the
foreign issuer's domestic laws is worth damaging foreign
governments' confidence in the United States.2 76
The British government established a regulatory agency, the
Financial Services Agency ("FSA"), which is entrusted with,
among other things, the regulatory responsibilities of the securities
markets within the United Kingdom.2 77 The FSA oversees a
regulatory system that encompasses rules to regulate the activity
within the United Kingdom's markets. 278  The United Kingdom
created this agency along with its laws and regulations based upon
its own policy considerations as a sovereign nation. 27 9  As the
271 See Gregory K. Matson, Restricting the Jurisdiction of American Courts Over
Transnational Securities Fraud, 79 GEO. L.J. 141, 163 (1990).
272 See id at 166-67.
273 See generally Brief of the Government of the Commonwealth of Australia as
Amicus Curiae in Support of the Respondents at 12-13, Morrison v. Nat'l Austi. Bank,
130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191) (showing that U.S. and Australian law differ on
these issues).
274 See Matson, supra note 271, at 167 (arguing that crucial differences between
U.S. law and the law of other nations could result in the United States seeming to dictate
securities law globally).
275 See id. at 167-68 (giving examples of various other securities law schemes and
the effect of U.S. hegemonic regulation on them).
276 Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2008).
277 See Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 7, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191)
[hereinafter Brief of the United Kingdom] (outlining powers of the FSA).
278 Id. at 7-8.
279 See id. at 21-22 (discussing the United Kingdom's concern with maintaining
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United States extends its jurisdiction to include corporations
located in foreign nations such as the United Kingdom, the United
States is ignoring the "fundamental interest" and policy interests
of these nations.280 As the U.S. Supreme Court stated, "[i]t is
especially inappropriate to apply U.S. laws to claims that 'may
embody different policy judgments.' 281
Foreign nations develop their own regulations and systems for
enforcing such regulations in an effort to regulate "their own
capital markets," not the capital markets located elsewhere.2 82
These systems may differ from each other and may be regulated
differently than U.S. markets. 283  As a result, when the United
States enforces its anti-fraud laws upon other nations possessing
their own regulatory mechanisms, and even those who do not,
there is a violation of international comity. 284  As noted by one
U.S. court, "United States law governs domestically but does not
rule the world." 285
Foreign nations have not hidden their displeasure with the
United States enforcing its laws upon foreign defendants.28 6 The
blocking statues passed by foreign legislatures display their
dissatisfaction.2 87 For example, the United Kingdom's blocking
statute directs citizens of the United Kingdom that foreign laws
providing for the application of extraterritorial jurisdiction are
potentially inadmissible if such statutes violate the jurisdiction of
the United Kingdom.288 Other nations that have passed this type of
their sovereignty).
280 Id.
281 Id. at 22 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T. Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 455 (2007)).
282 Brief of the United Kingdom, supra note 277, at 22.
283 Id
284 Id. at 23-24.
285 Id. at 22 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437, 454 (2007)).
286 Matson, supra note 271, at 166-67.
287 Id. at 167. A country's legislature passes blocking statutes in order to "block" its
citizens from abiding by the laws or court orders of a foreign nation. See Note, Secrecy
and Blocking Laws: A Growing Problem as the Internationalization of the Securities
Markets Continues, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 809, 822-23 (1985) (explaining how
blocking statutes prohibit foreign citizens from complying with U.S. laws). "These
blocking statutes represent the hostile reaction of the international community to
overzealous attempts on the part of the United States to impose its will on foreign
citizens." Matson, supra note 271, at 167.
288 Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, c. 11, § 1(1) (Eng.).
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legislation include*Canada, France, Australia, and South Africa. 289
Where other nations also have blocking statutes in place, there
is a high probability that the procedural and substantive
regulations will differ from the United States. 290 Extraterritorial
jurisdiction essentially means that through their decisions, U.S.
courts are manifesting conflicts of law in regards to both substance
and procedure.2 9 1 Procedurally, nations may differ in approaches
to discovery, the opportunity of multi-party litigation, and plaintiff
opt-out classes, among others.29 2 As "most other countries do not
have procedural devices that are even remotely similar to the U.S.
class action," 293 the U.S. judicial system allows for processes that
may look entirely different under the civil procedures of a foreign
294nation.
Canada's substantive approach to securities fraud differs from
that of the United States.2 95 Canada allows for securities fraud
class action litigation, but Canada does not recognize fraud on the
market doctrine within this litigation, a doctrine that plaintiffs
consistently use in U.S. litigation to make a showing of the
elements of a securities fraud claim.29 6
A very different example is that of Switzerland. Switzerland
only allows private remedies in securities fraud cases, but the
nation lacks any laws to regulate securities fraud.2 97  This may
seem inadequate to a nation such as the United States, where there
is a systematic means of regulation. But the U.S. judicial system
289 Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act 1984 (Cth) (Austl.); Foreign
Extraterritorial Measures Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-29 (Can.); Loi 80-583 du 18 juillet 1980
[Law 80-583 of July 18, 1980] (Fr.); Protection of Business Act of 1978 § 1 (S. Afr.);
see Matson, supra note 271, at 167.
290 See supra note 289 and accompanying text.
291 See Buxbaum, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 53 at 270. See Kantor, supra
note 62 at 854-56.
292 Brief of the United Kingdom, supra note 277, at 19.
293 David A. Skeel, Jr., Can Majority Voting Provisions Do It all?, 52 EMORY L.J.
417, 423 (2003).
294 See Buxbaum, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 53, at 296 (giving the example
of treble damages and their unavailability in some international jurisdictions); see also
Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, 547 F.3d 167, 174 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Skeel, supra
note 293, at 423).
295 See Buxbaum, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 53, at 298.
296 See id. at 277.
297 See Morrison, 547 F.3d at 174.
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must ask if it is within its authority to use its discretion to provide
a remedy to investors who knowingly invested in a securities
market in a country that provides no remedy for potential injury.298
The application of extraterritorial jurisdiction creates an
overlap, which creates a jurisdictional conflict. 2 99  U.S. courts
would bind foreign issuers to U.S. securities laws even though the
foreign securities issuer had no intention of falling under the scope
of U.S. laws.300 Additionally, the United States may be using its
judicial resources to decide cases that would be more
appropriately heard in another venue.30'
The U.S. judicial system has limited resources.3 02  Foreign-
cubed cases filed in U.S. courts demand a portion of the
judiciary's capacity.303 These cases deprive claims that are
undoubtedly within the jurisdiction of U.S. courts of the essential
resources they need.3 04 Foreign-cubed cases are using the limited
judicial resources based upon a legal principle that is founded on
unstable legal grounds.3 0' When foreign-cubed cases are filed in
U.S. courts, the United States must use its own judicial resources
for the litigation, even though these cases could be heard in
another, more appropriate venue.306 These are cases that are filed
in U.S. courts against the nation's long-standing presumption
against such far-reaching jurisdiction.30' By allowing U.S. courts
to try foreign-cubed class actions and permitting the SEC to bring
suit against foreign securities issuers that do not trade on a U.S.
298 See Brief of the United Kingdom, supra note 277, at 27 (arguing that the lack of
regulatory measures does not necessarily provide the United States with the authority to
extend extraterritorial jurisdiction).
299 Knox, supra note 73, at 358. The Supreme Court voiced this same idea in the
past, where the Court's stated, "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains." Murray v. The Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).
300 Daniel Kahn, The Collapsing Jurisdictional Boundaries of the Antifraud
Provisions of the U.S. Securities Laws: The Supreme Court and Congress Ready to
Redress Forty Years ofAmbiguity, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & Bus. 365,393 (2010).




305 Kahn, supra note 300, at 409-10.
306 See id at 409.
307 See Knox, supra note 73, at 352.
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exchange, limited judicial resources are being used for cases
where domestic conduct may be quite limited, if existent at all.308
While there is a procedural advantage in allowing for
extraterritorial jurisdiction in foreign-cubed cases, there are
procedural aspects of securities fraud cases that serve as a
disadvantage when extraterritorial jurisdiction is applied."
Considering that there may be a more appropriate forum
elsewhere, for instance where the venue is more convenient for the
parties to try the securities fraud case, this may open up the door to
multiple lawsuits."o This would allow plaintiffs to take "two bites
of the apple."3 11
It is debatable whether a U.S. court would recognize a
judgment by a foreign court.3 12 There is no reason why a foreign
nation would find that it had to enforce a judgment in a foreign-
cubed case when the United States was not the most appropriate
jurisdiction for a judgment to be rendered.3 13 It is generally
observed that if a judgment is granted in a claim, the plaintiff
cannot receive a second judgment for the same claim.3 14 It is also
generally likely that foreign nations that also recognize class
action suits in securities cases will recognize this preclusion
principle.3 15
Instead of recognizing and enforcing the U.S. judgment, a
foreign judicial system may opt to hold a securities issuer
accountable under its own jurisdictional laws and standards.3 16
This supplies foreign plaintiffs with multiple jurisdictions in which
to file a claim and ultimately recover damages." This allows not
only for duplicative litigation but also for duplicative recovery.318
308 Kahn, supra note 300, at 410.
309 Brief of the United Kingdom, supra note 277, at 28.
310 See Kahn, supra note 300, at 413.
311 Brief of the United Kingdom, supra note 277, at 28.
312 See Kahn, supra note 300, at 413.
313 Id.
314 Id.
315 See Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions, supra note 89, at 60.
316 See id. (explaining that when there is jurisdictional overlap, foreign states may
simply not enforce any U.S. judgment granted).
317 Id
318 Id at 59-60.
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Defendants are at the mercy of the courts and face inconsistent
outcomes or even multiple judgments."' The most efficient and
effective policy for the U.S. judicial system is to focus its
resources on the cases where it is ensured that an effective and
meaningful judgment will be enforced.3 20  "There is the
accompanying risk that the 'precious resources of United States
courts and law enforcement agencies' could be devoted to cases
that may be unfairly duplicated in other jurisdictions."3 21
Foreign plaintiffs may have the ability to forum shop and may
be able to recover in multiple jurisdictions; therefore, they might
make decisions on where to try their case based upon where they
can recover without losing the ability to then file in another
jurisdiction that will ignore any presumption of preclusion.3 22 The
potential for forum shopping supports the argument that
extraterritorial jurisdiction should be denied in order to prevent
plaintiffs from recovering in multiple jurisdictions.32 3
There are two reasons why plaintiffs would forum shop in
foreign-cubed cases. First, plaintiffs are aware of the substantial
judgments awarded in U.S. courts and of the possibility that a U.S.
court will extend its jurisdictional authority to hear their case.324
Once the U.S. court decides the case, there is potential that the
plaintiffs may be able to file their claim in another jurisdiction.3 25
Second, some foreign nations do not recognize class action law,
and when the plaintiffs have no remedy in their own nation, they
may resort to forum shopping.326 When international forum
shopping implicates other nations' interests, it interferes with the
United States' relationships with those countries.327 Yet, in
regards to extraterritorial jurisdiction in relation to securities fraud,
319 See Brief of the United Kingdom, supra note 277, at 28 (showing that cases may
be inadvertently allowed to proceed in the United States and the United Kingdom,
causing multiple outcomes).
320 Id
321 Id. at 28 (quoting Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir.
1975)).




326 Id. at 60-61.
327 See Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions, supra note 89, at 61.
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international implications in these circumstances lack the hostility
and severity that may be the result of extending extraterritorial
jurisdiction in other areas of the law.328 Nevertheless, due to the
interest of consistency and the presumption against extraterritorial
jurisdiction, U.S. courts have an interest in keeping a tight rein on
how far the scope of U.S. jurisdiction should extend.3 29
IV. Legislative Response to Morrison
Soon after the Supreme Court issued its decision on Morrison,
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act"). 3 30 The purpose of
the legislation was "[t]o promote the financial stability of the
United States by improving accountability and transparency in the
financial system, to end 'too big to fail', to protect the American
taxpayer by ending bailouts, to protect consumers from abusive
financial services practices, and for other purposes."3 3 1
Included in this financial reform legislation, and aligned with
the purpose of the Dodd-Frank Act, is a provision that reflects
Congress' reaction to the Court's Morrison decision.332 This
legislative provision can be interpreted as a responsive legislative
328 See id at 62.
329 Id If foreign policy is an issue produced by extraterritorial jurisdiction, then this
complicates the role of the U.S. judicial system in trying such foreign securities claims.
See Buxbaum, Regulatory Litigation, supra note 53, at 290. Foreign policy is a
responsibility of the executive branch, not the judicial branch. Id. Complicating the line
between how the judicial branch should manage its jurisdiction and issues of foreign
policy arising within those considerations creates a separation of powers dilemma. Id.
As the authority of the two branches is to remain separate, the judicial branch, by
deciding to extend extraterritorial jurisdiction is invading an exclusive consideration of
the executive branch. Id.
330 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (to be codified in scattered
provisions of the U.S.C.); Letter from Hannah L. Buxbaum, to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary, Securities and Exchange Commission (Feb. 18, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-14.pdf (noting that while the provision in
Dodd-Frank may have been drafted before the Supreme Court decided Morrison, it is
viewed as Congress' reaction to the decision).
331 Dodd-Frank Act pmbl.
332 See Painter et al., supra note 11, at 20 (noting that "Congress [in enacting the
Dodd-Frank legislation] intended to change the law (or at least change judicial
interpretation of prior law).").
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maneuver to undo the Morrison decision.3 33 Section 929P of the
Dodd-Frank Act includes a provision which amends the Exchange
Act in order to grant extraterritorial jurisdiction to federal courts in
certain cases where the SEC and other government enforcement
agencies bring a federal claim in securities fraud cases.33 4 The
Dodd-Frank Act states:
The district courts of the United States and the United States
courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of an action or
proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission or the
United States alleging a violation of the antifraud provisions of
this title involving-
(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes
significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the
securities transaction occurs outside the United States and
involves only foreign investors; or
(2) conduct occurring outside of the United States that has a
foreseeable substantial impact within the United States.335
While it is seems as though the Supreme Court, in deciding
Morrison, did not make an exception for the SEC or other
enforcement agencies to have a public right to bring a Rule 1 Ob-5
claim in extraterritorial securities cases, Congress attempts to use
this portion of the Dodd-Frank Act to carve out an exception.3 36
Congress's requirement that the SEC must solicit public comments
and then conduct a study in order to determine to what extent the
anti-fraud provision of the Exchange Act should allow for a
private right of action is another example of the congressional
intent behind the Dodd-Frank Act.337
All in all, the legislation shows that Congress clearly intended
to overturn what the Court decided less than a month earlier in
Morrison. In Morrison the Court never granted the U.S. courts
333 Id. at 19-20.
334 See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b)(2) (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2010)).
335 Id.
336 See Painter et al., supra note 11, at 19 ("Congress clearly intended: to empower
the SEC to bring cases where the conduct was that described in the statute [under
10(b)].").
337 See Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y(a).
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extraterritorial jurisdiction over securities fraud cases.3 38 Instead
the Court held that when lacking explicit congressional intent, the
transactional test should be applied to determine if jurisdiction
should be extended. 3 9  The Court sided with the presumption
against extraterritorial jurisdiction because Congress had not
explicitly stated that there was such jurisdiction in the statute, so
none existed.34 0 Nonetheless, Congress' intent is clearer than it
has ever been with the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act; as the
Congressional Record notes:
[There] are securities frauds in which not all of the fraudulent
conduct occurs within the United States or not all of the
wrongdoers are located domestically. The bill creates a single
national standard for protecting investors affected by
transnational frauds by codifying the authority to bring
proceedings under both the conduct and the effects tests
developed by the courts regardless of the jurisdiction of the
proceedings.
... This bill's provisions concerning extraterritoriality, however,
are intended to rebut that presumption by clearly indicating that
Congress intends extraterritorial application in cases brought by
the SEC or the Justice Department.34'
The Dodd-Frank Act marks Congress's return to the "old" way
of determining jurisdiction in extraterritorial cases by legislatively
defining the conduct and effects tests.3 42  Here, Congress is
338 See Morrison v. Nat'1 Austi. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2873 (2010).
339 Id. at 2873 ("It is a 'longstanding principle of American law 'that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States."") (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 248 (1991)).
340 Id
341 See 156 CONG. REC. H5237 (daily ed: June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep. Paul
Kanjorsky), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CREC-2010-06-30/html/CREC-
2010-06-30-ptl-PgH5233.htm.
342 See Jim Hamilton, Dodd-Frank Provision Rebuts the Supreme Court
Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of the Federal Securities Law, JIM
HAMILTON'S WORLD OF SEC. REGULATIONS (July 9, 2010, 9:09 AM),
http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/2010/07/dodd-frank-provision-rebuts-supreme.html
(noting that the "laws are intended to rebut that presumption by clearly indicating that
Congress intends extraterritorial application in cases brought by the SEC or the Justice
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limiting the scope of the Court's Morrison decision and working
to make its intent clear: to set one national, uniform jurisdictional
standard upon which protection against fraud will be provided for
investors who participate in transnational securities markets."'
Although this comment argues that Congress has been
unsuccessful in overturning Morrison, if Congress is able to
succeed, the conduct and effects test would govern SEC actions
against foreign defendants. In return, foreign-cubed class actions
would also be permitted in U.S. courts.344 Congress's attempt in
accepting and reverting back to the pre-Morrison jurisdictional
world, at least in SEC cases, leaves courts to deal with the problem
that Morrison attempted to solve.3 45
V. Court's Response to Conflicting Guidance
A. Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group...
Morrison does more than simply impede foreign-cubed
plaintiffs; the pivotal decision implicates more than those foreign
parties transacting on foreign exchanges.3 47 As the court described
the Morrison decision in its opinion in Cornwell, "[t]his [c]ourt is
not convinced that the Supreme Court designed Morrison to be
squeezed, as in spandex, only into the factual straitjacket of its
holding."3 48  Additionally, the court discussed the sweeping
expanse of Morrison as it affects all Section 10(b) cases.34 9 There
is no language in the Court's decision that permits any exceptions
to this transactional rule.350
Department.").
343 See id.
344 The U.S. Dodd Frank Act: Implications for Foreign Issuers, CRAVATH, SWAINE
& MOORE LLP (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.cravath.com/US-Dodd-Frank-Act-
Implications-for-Foreign-Private-Issuers-08-04-2010/.
345 Id.
346 729 F. Supp. 2d 620 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
347 Id.
348 Id. at 625.
349 Id. at 623 (discussing that the Court in Morrison rejected all international
applications of § 10(b) because it fails to express any specific extraterritorial scope).
350 Id. at 625 ("[T]he majority reached beyond the four corners of the case before it
and went out of its way to fashion a new rule designed to correct the enumerated flaws
the Court found in the [conduct and effects tests], while also fully aware of its far
broader implications.").
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The plaintiffs in Cornwell argued that the Court intended for
Morrison to be a narrow decision, applying only to foreign-cubed
plaintiffs."' Nevertheless, any ambiguity in exempting non-
foreign cubed plaintiffs from the application of the transactional
test soon became clear when the Cornwell court found in favor of
the application of American laws to securities that are governed by
the laws of another country. 35 2
Less than a month after the Court handed down its decision in
Morrison, the Cornwell court helped facilitate an understanding of
what this decision would mean for securities issuers going
forward-that the transactional test would bar protection under
U.S. law for foreign securities purchases or sales on a foreign
exchange regardless of whether American investors executed the
agreements or if some part of the transaction occurred in the
United States.3 53 Thus, since the plaintiffs in Cornwell argued that
the court should have exercised jurisdiction because of a
connection between the securities transaction and the United
States, it is an impermissible exception to the bright-line
transactional test. 354
B. In re Alstom, S.A. Securities Litigation3 55
In the months following the Morrison decision and the passage
of the Dodd-Frank Act, a district court in the Second Circuit
applied the new Morrison transactional test.356  The plaintiffs
argued that even if securities were sold on foreign exchanges, the
fact that securities were sold on domestic exchanges should be
enough.357 They also argued that the fact that domestic exchanges
were implicated meant that the court should extend supplemental
jurisdiction, applying French law, to cover those securities sold on
foreign exchanges.3 58
351 Cornwell, 729 F. Supp. 2d at 622.
352 Id. at 624-25.
353 Id. at 625-26. As the court discussed, and is obvious considering the presence
of the United States in global markets, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to find a
security transaction to which the United States has no connection of any sort. Id.
354 Id. at 622.
355 741 F. Supp. 2d 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
356 Id. at 471.
357 Id. at 471-72.
358 Id. at 472. It is interesting to note the eagerness of the plaintiffs to have the case
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As a case involving private plaintiffs, not the SEC, the
implication of Morrison seemed obvious in In re Alstom. 35 9 As the
district court clearly noted, the Supreme Court in Morrison was
concerned with the territorial location of the transaction-the
result should be that any claim involving a transaction on a foreign
exchange should be dismissed, and no supplemental jurisdiction
should be extended by a U.S. court.36 0 The court in In re Alstom
correctly dismissed all such claims that attempted to claim U.S.
jurisdiction on transactions on a foreign exchange.36 '
C. In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Securities Litigation3 62
One question that remained open after Morrison was partially-
resolved by In re Vivendi Universal: what should courts do about
cross-listed securities?363 In re Vivendi Universal listed ordinary
shares on the New York Stock Exchange and on foreign
exchanges.36 4 Ultimately, the In re Vivendi Universal court found
that there is no indication that the Supreme Court intended Section
10(b) to apply to cross-listed exchanges.36 5 Thus, what previously
seemed unclear now gains a sense of clarity: If the transaction
takes place on a foreign exchange, even if the securities are cross-
listed on a domestic exchange, there is no court that can grant such
plaintiffs relief.
Another point of clarification within the court's discussion is
the definition of a "domestic transaction."3 6 6 The court noted that
"there is little doubt that the phrase was intended to be a reference
to the location of the transaction, not to the location of the
heard in an American court, which implicates the policies discussed Part VII of this
comment. See infra Part VII.
359 In re Alstom 741 F. Supp. 2d at 471. Dodd-Frank created the conflict between
how the SEC as a plaintiff should be treated compared to private plaintiffs. See Painter
et al., supra note 11, at 19 (discussing the treatment of the SEC in the Dodd-Frank Act).
The Court in this case seemingly sees no alternative to the application of the
transactional test in the wake of Morrison. In re Alstom, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 471.
360 In re Alstom, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 471-72.
361 Id. at 473.
362 765 F. Supp. 2d 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
363 Id. at 531.
364 Id.
365 Id.
366 Id. at 532.
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purchaser. . . ."36 This applies regardless of whether or not the
purchaser is American."'
D. SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co. and Fabrice Tourre3 69
Courts seemed to have some difficulty in applying the
transactional test to securities fraud cases arising post-Morrison.370
Until Goldman Sachs, questions still remained: How does Dodd-
Frank impact the Morrison decision? Did Congress actually
achieve what it intended with the passage of Dodd-Frank? Did
Congress succeed in overturning Morrison?
While such questions appear to remain unanswered,3 7'
Goldman Sachs does suggest that the Court was successful in
broadly applying a presumption against extraterritorial
jurisdiction.3 72 The Morrison decision applied to both private and
public plaintiffs. 373  While decided before the passage of Dodd-
Frank, the court in Goldman Sachs refused to extend its
jurisdiction over parties that did not engage in domestic
transactions, even if one of those parties is the SEC.374
VI. What Can Plaintiffs Do?
A. State Law Actions
Perhaps one solution for plaintiffs is to avoid federal securities
law altogether. In January 2012, a group of investors sued Sino-
Forest along with its underwriters in U.S. federal court.37 5 Rather
than filing for relief based upon U.S. securities laws, the plaintiffs
367 In re Vivendi Universal, 765 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
368 Id. at 533.
369 790 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
370 Id. at 157.
371 At this time, it is unclear whether or not a court will extend extraterritorial
jurisdiction to cases with a public plaintiff.
372 Goldman Sachs, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
373 See Rose et al., supra note 216.
374 Goldman Sachs, 790 F. Supp. 2d at 160.
375 See Alison Frankel, U.S. Investors Morrison-Proof New Sino-Forest Fraud Suit,
THOMSON REUTERS NEWS & INSIGHT (Jan. 31, 2012)
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/NewYork/News/2012/01-
January/U_S investors Morrison-proof newSino-Forest fraud suit/.
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are seeking relief under state laws.376 These plaintiffs allege
common-law fraud, unjust enrichment and breach of fiduciary
duty under New York State law rather than appealing to federal
securities fraud.37 7 An advantage to filing under New York State
laws is that the parties "avoid the procedural strictures of the
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the heightened
pleading standards for securities fraud."3 78
B. Seek ReliefElsewhere
Since Morrison drastically changed the legal landscape of U.S.
securities fraud in the United States, other countries have reaped
the benefits.3 79  For instance, plaintiffs have discovered that
Canadian courts are accessible for claims of securities fraud."
Canadian lawyers have taken advantage of the uncertainty of U.S.
extraterritorial jurisdictions by finding plaintiffs who would have
sought relief via the U.S. class action mechanism and filed those
cases in Canadian courts instead."' Canada is experiencing the
highest level of securities class actions in history, and this trend is
expected to continue at least through 2012.382 One of the reasons
attributed to this upswing is the effect of the Morrison decision in
U.S. courts.383 A recent example is that rather than filing in the
United States, plaintiffs are instead seeking relief in Canada
against the Chinese company Sino-Forest.3 84 The outcome of this






380 Frankel, supra note 375 ("Canada has become something of a plaintiffs' paradise
for securities litigation, especially in contrast to the United States.").
381 See id.
382 Filings of Securities Class Actions in Canada Reach New High, BUSINESS WIRE





385 See Luke Green, Securities Class Action Services, LLC, Case Brief Sino-Forest
and Asset Recovery in Canada, available at
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Aside from Canada, the Netherlands provides a form of
collective action in which foreign investors can seek relief for
securities claims.3 86 Dutch law allows for a representative
organization to file on behalf of a group of individuals who have
opted-in.3 87 Recent use of the Act on Collective Settlement of
Mass Damages by Dutch courts is creating a more appealing
forum for global securities litigation.3 88 While there are glaring
differences between the Dutch class action and that which is
provided by the United States, this Dutch act allows for binding,
global settlements;389 such a settlement requires court approval.3 90
The settlement agreement is legally binding and all individuals
who are a part of the foundation are bound by the settlement
unless they exercise their right to opt-out. 391 Despite the possible
benefits of these actions, the difficulty in enforcing the settlement
on parties within the European Union is at least one downside to
bringing these claims in Dutch courts.392
While it appears to be a viable option that private plaintiffs can
bring actions against foreign securities issuers in other courts
outside of the United States, these plaintiffs may have issues
working within the context of foreign class action regimes.3 93 For
http://www.issgovemance.com/files/ISSSecuritiesClassActionServicesSinoForestCaseBr
ief.pdf. Canada's law mimics the broader jurisdictional standard of the conduct and
effects tests. Id. The Ontario Securities Act allows for jurisdiction if there is a
substantial connection to Ontario. Id. Australia is another country with the potential for
global securities litigation. Id.
386 Frankel, supra note 375.
387 Id.
388 See Kevin LaCroix, Dutch Court Holds Collective Securities Settlement to Be





391 See Frankel, supra note 375. Parties used this process to settle a 2009 action
against Royal Dutch Shell. LaCroix, supra note 388.
392 See LaCroix, surpa note 388 ("[W]hile the judgment of the Dutch court is in
principle enforceable in courts outside the Netherlands, it remains to be seen whether or
not other courts will in fact recognize the judgment.").
393 Green, supra note 385. For example, some countries treat individual class
members differently (i.e. opt-in versus opt-out), regarding contingency fees and payment
of legal fees. Id.
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these reasons, countries with class action mechanisms mirroring
the U.S. class action, such as Canada, have seen the uptick in
filings.39 4
VII. Morrison and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Outside
of Securities Fraud
Since the Supreme Court's decision, some effects have been
observed in global securities law.'9 A crucial indication as to how
much this decision can, and should be, extended is reflected in
what Justice Scalia wrote in his opinion in Morrison; he noted that
"'unless there is an affirmative intention of the Congress clearly
expressed' to give a statute extraterritorial effect, 'we must
presume it is primarily concerned with domestic concerns.' . . .
When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial
application, it has none."3 96 While only dicta, this statement is a
powerful one, which has the potential to affect not just securities
fraud plaintiffs, but to affect a broader realm of plaintiffs.
While Morrison has the potential to extend to criminal cases, it
seems likely that the broad spectrum of cases to which Morrison
may be extended will probably not include criminal cases.397
Rather, Morrison's effects are being seen in antitrust, racketeering,
trade secrets, bankruptcy clawbacks, and alien tort cases.39 8 The
basis for these applications is the lack of extraterritorial language
contained in the statutes that the cases were brought under.3 99
While perhaps only dicta, the language of the Morrison is creating
a strong force for the case's application. George Conway, III
described the impact saying:
394 Id
395 See Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010).
396 Id. at 2877-78 (internal citations omitted).
397 Courts appear to be avoiding the application of Morrison's extraterritorial
jurisdiction test to criminal cases. Instead the courts are relying on the 1922 U.S.
Supreme Court opinion, United States v. Bowman 260 U.S. 94 (1922), which found that
extraterritorial jurisdiction can be inferred from U.S. criminal laws. See, e.g., United
States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 811-13 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying Bowman and not
Morrison to a criminal torture case).
398 See Alison Frankel, Morrison v. NAB's 2nd Act: Way Beyond Securities Fraud
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There was never any question that Morrison would affect other
statutes .... Still, it's been amazing to see the decision's
extraordinary impact actually unfold .... Morrison
straightforwardly applied a longstanding canon of construction,
the presumption against extraterritoriality. But it did so more
emphatically than ever before, perhaps because the justices
realized that their earlier decisions . . . hadn't always been
followed. By overturning four decades of significant lower-
court securities cases, the Supreme Court made quite sure this
time that its message on extraterritoriality will get through.40 0
VIII. Conclusion
At the time of publication, there are many questions still
unanswered. For now, global classes of plaintiffs must seek
alternate forums for relief in securities fraud cases or find a way to
maneuver around the bright-line rule of Morrison. It is also
unclear whether or not U.S. courts will allow the SEC to bring
claims that require extraterritorial jurisdiction as the Dodd-Frank
Act intended.
What is clear is that Morrison has changed the entire civil
legal landscape in the United States. One statement made by
Justice Scalia in dicta has forced lawmakers to reexamine
language used in bills and laws and encouraged judges to apply
the presumption of extraterritorial jurisdiction.
400 Id.
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